As machine learning models are increasingly being employed in various high-stakes settings, it becomes important to ensure that predictions of these models are not only adversarially robust, but also readily explainable to relevant stakeholders. However, it is unclear if these two notions can be simultaneously achieved or if there exist trade-offs between them. In this work, we make one of the first attempts at studying the impact of adversarially robust models on actionable explanations which provide end users with a means for recourse. We theoretically and empirically analyze the cost (ease of implementation) and validity (probability of obtaining a positive model prediction) of recourses output by state-of-the-art algorithms when the underlying models are adversarially robust vs. non-robust. More specifically, we derive theoretical bounds on the differences between the cost and the validity of the recourses generated by state-of-the-art algorithms for adversarially robust vs. non-robust linear and non-linear models. Our empirical results with multiple real-world datasets validate our theoretical results and show the impact of varying degrees of model robustness on the cost and validity of the resulting recourses. Our analyses demonstrate that adversarially robust models significantly increase the cost and reduce the validity of the resulting recourses, thus shedding light on the inherent trade-offs between adversarial robustness and actionable explanations.

Adversarial examples, inputs designed to induce worst-case behavior in machine learning models, have been extensively studied over the past decade. Yet, our understanding of this phenomenon stems from a rather fragmented pool of knowledge; at present, there are a handful of attacks, each with disparate assumptions in threat models and incomparable definitions of optimality. In this paper, we propose a systematic approach to characterize worst-case (i.e., optimal) adversaries. We first introduce an extensible decomposition of attacks in adversarial machine learning by atomizing attack components into surfaces and travelers. With our decomposition, we enumerate over components to create 576 attacks (568 of which were previously unexplored). Next, we propose the Pareto Ensemble Attack (PEA): a theoretical attack that upper-bounds attack performance. With our new attacks, we measure performance relative to the PEA on: both robust and non-robust models, seven datasets, and three extended lp-based threat models incorporating compute costs, formalizing the Space of Adversarial Strategies. From our evaluation we find that attack performance to be highly contextual: the domain, model robustness, and threat model can have a profound influence on attack efficacy. Our investigation suggests that future studies measuring the security of machine learning should: (1) be contextualized to the domain & threat models, and (2) go beyond the handful of known attacks used today.

We present a new certification method for image and point cloud segmentation based on randomized smoothing. The method leverages a novel scalable algorithm for prediction and certification that correctly accounts for multiple testing, necessary for ensuring statistical guarantees. The key to our approach is reliance on established multiple-testing correction mechanisms as well as the ability to abstain from classifying single pixels or points while still robustly segmenting the overall input. Our experimental evaluation on synthetic data and challenging datasets, such as Pascal Context, Cityscapes, and ShapeNet, shows that our algorithm can achieve, for the first time, competitive accuracy and certification guarantees on real-world segmentation tasks. We provide an implementation at https://github.com/eth-sri/segmentation-smoothing.